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Social Utility Functions—Part II: Applications
Wynn C. Stirling and Richard L. Frost, Member, IEEE

Abstract—Social utilities account for agent preferences and,
thus, can characterize complex interrelationships, such as cooperation, compromise, negotiation, and altruism, that can exist
between agents. Satisﬁcing game theory, which is based on social
utilities, offers a framework within which to design sophisticated multiagent systems. Key features of this approach are: a)
-agent system may be represented by a 2 -dimensional
an
Bayesian network, called a praxeic network; b) the theory accommodates a notion of situational altruism (a willingness to defer to
others in a controlled way if so doing would actually beneﬁt others
under the condition that others wish to take advantage of such
largesse); and c) satisﬁcing games admits a protocol for effective
negotiation between agents who, though interested in their own
welfare, are also willing to give some deference to others. Three
applications are presented. The ﬁrst two involve well-known
two-person games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Battle of the
Sexes, and the third is a simulated uninhabited aerial vehicle
scenario.
Index Terms—Altruism, Bayesian networks, decision making,
distributed control, intelligent systems, multiagent systems, negotiations, satisﬁcing games.

I. INTRODUCTION

M

ETHODOLOGIES for the design of effective multiagent systems should account for sophisticated agent
behaviors such as cooperation, compromise, negotiation,
and altruism. Conventional decision-making methodologies
attempt to optimize individual performance (even if only
approximately) and have a limited capability to account for
complex social behavior. Essentially, this is because optimization is an individual activity that is based on the doctrine that
each individual is committed to maximizing its own satisfaction
without concern for the welfare of others. Group interests are
generally not optimized and perhaps not even well served
if each individual optimizes its own behavior (see [1] for a
detailed discussion). Designs that put ﬁnal conﬁdence in the
limited perspective of pure self-interest may ultimately function
disjunctively, and perhaps illogically, when participating in
collective activities that would more naturally be expressions
of sophisticated social behavior.
Even though cooperative behavior may be desired of a multiagent system, it would be rare indeed for the interests of all
agents to be perfectly aligned. Some form of conﬂict, even if
minor, is likely to be present. Decision makers must have the
capability to give deference to others and compromise, but they
must not be required to capitulate and unconditionally surrender
their interests in all situations. They must be able to negotiate efManuscript received June 4, 2004; revised August 27, 2004. This paper was
recommended by Guest Editor C. Malmborg.
The authors are with the Electrical and Computing Engineering Department,
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602 USA (e-mail: wynn@ee.byu.edu;
rickf@ee.byu.edu).
Digital Object Identiﬁer 10.1109/TSMCC.2004.843200

fectively without either undue intransigence or overeagerness to
defer. These requirements call for a decision-making methodology that allows each member of a decision-making society
to maintain its own interests while, at the same time, yielding
some deference, in a controlled way, to others as the situation
warrants. Such behavior requires each individual to seek a social balance between its individual interests and the interests of
others.
Achieving social balance requires a concept of rational
behavior that is more ﬂexible and accommodating than optimization which, by its very structure, is rigid and intransigent.
In [2], an alternative notion of rational behavior is presented,
termed satisﬁcing rationality, and a summary of this approach
is given in [1]. Satisﬁcing serves as an alternative to the more
familiar notion of optimization. Just as individual rationality is
formalized in multiagent settings by von Neumann–Morgenstern (vN-M) game theory, satisﬁcing rationality is formalized
in multiagent settings by satisﬁcing game theory. This theory
provides a mechanism by which cooperative social systems
may be synthesized according to a systematic concept of rational behavior that involves social utilities; that is, utilities that
account for the interests of others as well as of the self.
Three main issues must be addressed in order to establish
credibility of the social utilities approach: i) we must develop
a systematic way to obtain a solution once the model has been
formulated; ii) we must test its performance and compare it with
results obtained by conventional means; and, ultimately iii) we
must implement and evaluate performance in real-world situations. In this paper, we address the ﬁrst two of these criteria.
Following a brief summary of satisﬁcing game theory, we show
how it can be formulated as a praxeic network, similar in structure to a Bayesian network, and discuss the relevant computational issues. We next describe two important aspects of sophisticated social behavior; namely, situational altruism and negotiation, and indicate how these concepts can be modeled with social utility theory. We then provide three applications of this new
concept of multiagent decision theory. The ﬁrst two comprise
satisﬁcing solutions to two well-known mixed-motive games:
Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes. The Prisoner’s
Dilemma characterizes situations where cooperation is possible,
but the players must guard against exploitation. The Battle of
the Sexes is a coordination game where either both players win
or both lose. The third application is an analysis of a simulated
multiagent uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) scenario, in which
we analyze and compare the performance of both satisﬁcing and
optimal decision methodologies.
II. SATISFICING DECISION THEORY
A. Interdependence
players, denoted
A multiagent system is a set of
, each with its corresponding ﬁnite op-
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tion set
where

. The vectors
,
, constitute a joint option. The product space
is the joint option space. Satisﬁcing
game theory [2] is a new approach to multiagent decision
making that accounts simultaneously for both group and individual interests. It does this by replacing optimization as the
ideal of performance in favor of a notion of adequacy as the
ideal. A decision is good enough, or satisﬁcing, if the beneﬁts
from adopting it are at least as great as the costs. To form a
precise deﬁnition of satisﬁcing, we view each decision maker
as consisting of two personas. The selectability persona for
, denoted , views the options available to it exclusively
in terms of achieving the goal, while the rejectability persona
, denoted , views the options exclusively in terms of
for
the consumption of resources. An option is satisﬁcing if the
selectability persona’s support for it exceeds the rejectability
persona’s objections. To evaluate these degrees of support, we
must deﬁne utility functions for the two personas. For each ,
be a selectability function characterizing the relative
let
degree of support that
associates with the elements of ,
be a rejectability function characterizing the degree
and let
of opposition (e.g., the consumption of resources) that
associates with the elements of . These functions constitute
dual utilities which make possible intrinsic, or intraoption
comparisons of the attributes of each option in contrast to the
usual extrinsic (interoption) comparisons that single (vN-M)
utilities afford. To emphasize this distinction, we will refer to
and
as social utilities.
As developed in [1], normalizing the social utilities to be
mass functions makes it possible to express them as marginals
of joint selectability and rejectability functions, which provide
evaluations of the relative degrees of achieving a group goal
and consuming group resources for each option vector
. That is
(1)

Fig. 1.

Praxeic network for a three-agent system.

B. Constructing the Interdependence Function
The speciﬁcation of the interdependence function is the key
issue when modeling a multiagent system, and constructing
this function is the ﬁrst order of business of satisﬁcing decision
theory. In [1], it is shown that the properties of probability
mass functions, such as conditioning and independence, also
apply to social utility functions. These properties, coupled
with the chain rule, provide a convenient and economical way
to construct the interdependence function as the product of
conditional and marginal mass functions. This construction
permits a multiagent system to be viewed from the perspective
of graph theory, and yields a structure that is similar to a
Bayesian network [3]–[5]. We may employ the tools of graph
theory to express a multiagent system as a directed acyclic
graph (DAG). To distinguish between the usual probabilistic
application and our context, we will refer to such networks as
praxeic networks. A praxeic network for an -agent system
consists of
nodes, with each participant having two nodes
associated with it—one for its selectability persona and one for
its rejectability persona. The variables associated with these
nodes are the options available to the decision maker and the
edges represent the inﬂuence that one persona has on another
persona. These linkages consist of conditional selectability
or conditional rejectability functions. Consider the graph displayed in Fig. 1, which corresponds to a three-agent system
whose interdependence function is given by
(5)

(2)

where
and
are the groups
of agents considered exclusively in terms of joint selectability
and joint rejectability, respectively.
Since the rejectability or selectability of one or more agents
may affect the preferences for rejection or selection of another
agent or agents, we must view the joint selectability and joint rejectability functions as marginals of a more complex mass function that accounts for all relevant interrelationships that exist
among the members of the multiagent system. That is
(3)
(4)
where

is called the interdependence function.

Notice that because of the structure of the interdependence function, persona
does not inﬂuence, and is not inﬂuenced by, any
other personas.
There are two major distinctions between Bayesian networks
and praxeic networks. First, whereas Bayesian networks deal
with the epistemological problem of what to believe, praxeic
networks deal with the praxeic problem of how to act. Second,
whereas Bayesian networks deal with one notion of probability—a measure of the degree of belief—praxeic networks
deal with two notions: selectability, which characterizes the
degree of effectiveness, and rejectability, which characterizes
the degree of inefﬁciency. Whereas Bayesian networks deﬁne
connections between random variables, praxeic networks deﬁne
connections between agent personas. With Bayesian networks,
the vertices correspond to the values that the random variable
can assume, and the edges represent the ﬂows of belief inﬂuence
between vertices as characterized by conditional probability
mass functions. By contrast, the vertices of a praxeic network
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represent the sets of actions that are possible for the agent
personas, and the edges characterize the ﬂows of preference
inﬂuence between the personas as characterized by conditional
selectability or rejectability mass functions. Although Bayesian
networks have been used in the multiagent context [6], [7], they
are used to model the ﬂow of information in the epistemic context as characterized by conditional probability mass functions,
rather than to model the ﬂow of praxeic inﬂuence as characterized by conditional social utility functions (mathematically, or
course, there is no difference between the two concepts).
C. Satisﬁcing Games
A satisﬁcing game is a triple
. To solve this
game, we ﬁrst compute joint selectability and joint rejectability
functions according to (3) and (4), and then the individual
selectability and rejectability functions according to (1) and
(2). These functions may be obtained by invoking, for example,
Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm [3] or the Sum–Product
rule for factor graphs [8].
The jointly satisﬁcing solution at caution level of a satisﬁcing game is the subset of all option vectors such that the joint
selectability is at least as great as the caution level times the joint
rejectability, that is

The individually satisﬁcing solutions for each agent are obtained from the marginal selectability and rejectability functions, yielding the individually satisﬁcing solutions

The jointly satisﬁcing set comprises all joint options that provide a group beneﬁt that exceeds (as modulated by ) the cost to
the group, and the individually satisﬁcing sets comprise all individual options that provide an individual beneﬁt that exceeds
(as modulated by ) the cost to the individual.
The satisﬁcing rectangle is the product set of the individually
satisﬁcing sets, namely

In general, the satisﬁcing rectangle will not be the same as the
jointly satisﬁcing set; they may even be disjointed. However, the
following theorem relates the two sets.
is individually satisﬁcing for agent , that is,
,
If
then it must be the th element of some jointly satisﬁcing vector
.
Proof: We will establish the contrapositive, namely, that if
is not the th element of any
, then
. Without
. By hypothesis,
loss of generality, let
for all
, so
, hence
.
Thus, if an option vector is individually satisﬁcing, it is part
of a jointly satisﬁcing vector, although it need not be part of all
jointly satisﬁcing vectors. The content of this theorem is that
no one is ever completely frozen out of a deal—every decision
maker has, from its own perspective, a seat at the negotiating
table. This condition is perhaps the weakest condition under
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grants equal
which negotiations are possible. Setting
weight to effectiveness and efﬁciency and ensures that the satisﬁcing sets are not empty. In practice, can be viewed as a
negotiation parameter. Reducing , increases the size of the satisﬁcing sets and permits the participants to lower their standards
in a controlled way to reach a compromise.
III. SOCIAL BALANCE
A well-balanced individual must be able to reconcile its own
interests with the interests of the group. While, on the one hand,
it must be able to accommodate the interests of others, on the
other hand, it must not be required to abandon its own interests
completely. Thus, even though it may possess a propensity to
cooperate, it must be able to control the degree of accommodation it is willing to offer others. Achieving this kind of balance
requires a sophisticated notion of altruism and a well-deﬁned
protocol for negotiation.
A. Altruism
Altruism literally means unselﬁshness. Typically, this is taken
in the positive sense, whereby an agent is willing to sacriﬁce in
order to beneﬁt another, but one could also consider negative
altruism, whereby a malevolent agent is willing to sacriﬁce in
order to injure another. In either case, the essence of the concept is that an altruistic agent takes into consideration the preferences of others when deﬁning its preferences. Conventional
notions of altruism [9] do not distinguish between the state of
actually relinquishing one’s own self-interest and the state of
being willing to relinquish one’s own self-interest under the
appropriate circumstances. To relinquish unconditionally one’s
own self-interest is a condition of categorical altruism—a decision maker unconditionally modiﬁes its preferences to accommodate the preferences of others in all circumstances. A purely
altruistic player would completely replace its preferences with
the preferences of others. By contrast, a state of being willing
to modify one’s preferences to accommodate others if the need
arises is a state of situational altruism. Here, a decision maker
is willing to accommodate, at least to some degree, the preferences of others in lieu of its own preferences if, and only if, the
other wishes to take advantage of the offered largesse. Otherwise, the agent would be governed by its own preferences and
would avoid needless sacriﬁce.
Situational altruism is a sophisticated form of unselﬁsh behavior that is not easily modeled with vN-M utility theory. Essentially, this is because vN-M utilities are functions of the actions of the players. On the other hand, social utilities are functions of the preferences of the players and, therefore, are more
suited to characterize sophisticated notions of social behavior
such as situational altruism. To illustrate, consider the persona
, with ’s options considered in terms of selectability
set
’s options considered in terms of rejectability. The corand
may be factored to
responding interdependence function
. Each option
become
generates a different conditional rejectability func; that is,
for all
and
tion
. Now, suppose that by not adopting
would altruistically beneﬁt
a certain option, say ,
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if it were to favor one of its options, say , but if
were to
would act egoistically.
accommodate this
favor , then
situation by the following conditional selectability structure:

if
if

and
and

(6)
if

where
is the number of options available to
, and
is
’s rejectability based solely on its own interests without
’s desires. Notice that
can
taking into consideration
’s
specify this conditional rejectability without knowing
actual selectability structure—it is a purely hypothetical conwould set
, resulting in
sideration. An altruistic

if
if

(7)

In this way,
exhibits situational altruism; it is willing to acby rejecting
if, but only if, doing so is critcommodate
’s welfare. For example, suppose
and
are to
ical to
purchase an automobile. Selectability might comprise attributes
such as performance, styling, and reliability, and rejectability
might comprise attributes such as the purchase price and opwould be willing to place high reerating costs. Suppose
jectability on paying less than (i.e., low rejectability for paying
more than ) for a vehicle if and only if
were to place
displays a willingness
high selectability on style . Thus,
without categorically relinquishing its individual
to indulge
preference.
B. Negotiations
Expanding the spheres of interest of the agents to consideration of the interests of others as well as oneself provides an environment that is conducive to negotiations. The negotiation theorem presented in Section II-C provides an environment where
the interests of all participants are represented, in that no one is
excluded from making deals. This structure invites the deﬁnition
of a very simple negotiation protocol that would be suitable for
a collection of decision makers each of who, in addition to being
intent upon pursuing its own self-interest, is willing to give some
deference to others. Such an agent would be inclined to compromise by giving up some of its assured beneﬁt if so doing would
offer signiﬁcant beneﬁt to others. Such a community could effectively negotiate for the beneﬁt of the group. The following
corollary to the Negotiation Theorem motivates a very simple
negotiation procedure for such a community.
Corollary 1: There exists an index of caution proﬁle such
.
that
The proof of this corollary is immediate: as
, every
option becomes satisﬁcing, that is,
.
denote ’s
Let denote the index of caution for , let
denote ’s version of
individually satisﬁcing set, and let
incrementally,
the jointly satisﬁcing set. By decreasing

increases its set of satisﬁcing decisions, thereby gradually lowering its standards of acceptable performance. It is thus able to
control the amount of deference it is willing to give to others
is also able to
in an attempt to reach a compromise. Each
, which sets a limit on the degree
specify a lower value,
of compromise it is willing to undergo. It is reasonable to assume that the standard of acceptance for the group can be no
higher than the minimum standard for any individuals, and we
may accordingly specify the index of caution of the group as
. For each value of ,
forms its compromise set as

Notice that it is not necessary for all agents to have the same
is the set of all joint actions such
interdependence function.
that, from the point of view of , are jointly satisﬁcing (that
is, that are good enough for everyone). It is easy to see that
so long as all indices of caution are less than or equal
to unity. The global compromise set is the intersection of all
compromise sets:
. A compromise will be reached
. If no compromise is reached before all
’s have
if
reached their limits, then an impasse exists and negotiations will
implements the
be broken off. If is singleton, then each
th component of the unique element of . If contains more
than one element, then the agents must undergo another round of
negotiation to ensure that they all choose the same jointly satisﬁcing option. If the agents all use the same interdependence
function model, then they may choose a tie breaker such as the
member of the global compromise set that maximizes the beneﬁt
.
to the group:
If they do not all use the same interdependence function, they
may adopt some other protocol as a tie-breaker. For example,
they could agree beforehand on a randomizing procedure to
choose a designated tie-breaking agent, who would pick one of
the members of for all to use.
By its very nature, negotiations cannot force a compromise.
If the interests of the agents are deeply contradictory, or if the
agents are rigid and intransigent, then attempts to negotiate may
not be fruitful, even if the consequence of failing to compromise
is severe. On the other hand, if agents are ﬂexible and accommodating, then negotiation may be conducive to success.
IV. APPLICATION 1: PRISONER’S DILEMMA
We now apply satisﬁcing game theory to the Prisoner’s
and ,
Dilemma game. This game comprises two players,
who may either cooperate ( ) or defect ( ) (see, for example,
[1] for details). (To review conventional solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, refer, for example, to [10] and [11].)
Our task is to deﬁne the interdependence function, from which
the selectability and rejectability functions can be obtained
and compared for each joint option. To generate the interdependence function, we must ﬁrst deﬁne operational notions
for selectability and rejectability. Suppose we view the players
as individuals who are concerned primarily with their own
welfare but, at the same time, have a degree of consideration
for other player’s difﬁculties and consider it a cost to them if
an action they take makes it difﬁcult for others. Although there
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are many ways to frame this problem, we adopt the procedure
of associating selectability with reducing individual jail time
and associating rejectability with increasing group jail time.
Thus, short individual sentences will have high individual
selectability, and long group sentences will have high joint
rejectability.
The notion of group interest can have signiﬁcance only if
there is some social relationship between the players. There are
(at least) two social desiderata that may affect their decisions: a)
a propensity for dissociation, that is, for each player to behave
without regard for the welfare of the other, and b) a propensity
for vulnerability; that is, for the players to expose themselves
to individual risk in the hope of improving the joint outcome.
be a measure of the joint value the players place
Let
. We may identify dissoon rejecting the joint option
ciation index: if
, the players are completely dissociated
be a measure
and cooperation is unlikely. Also, let
.
of the joint value placed on rejecting the joint option
may be viewed as a vulnerability index:
means the
players are each willing to risk receiving a long jail sentence in
the hopes of both obtaining a shorter one. A condition of high
dissociation and high vulnerability would indicate lack of concern for the welfare of the other player while, at the same time,
implying a willingness to expose oneself to dire consequences.
We may prohibit this inconsistent situation by imposing the con. If, for example,
and
, then
straint that
,
self-interest is the only consideration. If, however,
then the players are willing to assume high risk to achieve cois a condition of close associoperation. The case
ation coupled with a strong desire for invulnerability. This is a
condition of intransigence, which may lead to dysfunctional behavior. To avoid such situations, we also impose the somewhat
. In general, each player
arbitrary constraint that
would have its own set of these indices, which need not be the
same. To simplify our presentation, however, we assume that
and are common knowledge.
Our task is to deﬁne the interdependence function. Let
. We begin by examining the criteria for rejectability. Assuming that the consequences to the players are
symmetric, that is, the outcomes are independent of the identity
should be
of the players, then the joint rejectability of
. Furthermore, the deequal to the joint rejectability of
gree to which the players would jointly prefer to reject mutual
cooperation would be proportional to the index of dissociation,
and the degree to which they would prefer to reject mutual defection would be proportional to the index of vulnerability. With
these assumptions and the constraints on and , we deﬁne the
joint rejectability function

(8)
The constraint that
ensures that preferring to
reject the opposing actions (
or
) will always be at
least as rejectable as the minimum of preferring to reject similar
or
); thus, dysfunctional behavior is
behavior (
always more rejectable than coordinated behavior.
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TABLE I
CONDITIONAL SELECTABILITY p
(u ; u jv ; v )
FOR THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME

We now consider selectability. Although selectability deals
with individual objectives, it is a joint consideration since the
consequences of the players’ decisions are not independent and,
thus, preferences cannot be independent. A convenient way to
express this dependency is to compute joint selectability confor all
ditioned on joint rejectability
pairs
and
. The interdependence function may then be obtained by the product rule

(9)
The function
characterizes the
that the players jointly
selectability of the joint option
. We may compute
place all of their rejectability on
the conditional selectability by invoking straightforward and
and
jointly prefer
intuitive rules of the form: “If
, then they should jointly prefer to select
to reject
.” Let’s say
, that is, the players
jointly prefer to reject cooperation. Given this situation, it is
obvious that the preferred joint option is for both to defect.
We may encode this rule into the conditional selectability
function by placing all of the selectability on the joint option
, that is,
. If exactly one
player prefers to reject cooperating, then it is obvious that,
in this case as well, the preferred joint option is for both to
and
defect; consequently, we set
. We complete this development
by noting that if both players prefer to reject defecting, then
. Table I summarizes the structure of this conditional selectability function. Substituting the
conditional selectability function given by Table I and the joint
rejectability given by (8) and (9) yields the interdependence
function, whose values are provided in Table II. The praxeic
network for this system is given in Fig. 2.
Parameterized by and , the jointly satisﬁcing set is, for
for
for
for

,
,

(10)
These regions are depicted in Fig. 3(a). The joint satisﬁcing set
when the vulcoincides with the Pareto optimal solution
nerability index is at least as large as 1/2. It coincides with the
Nash solution when the vulnerability index is less than the dissociation index. If the vulnerability index is greater than dissociation index but less than 1/2, then the joint satisﬁcing set conand
. To take action in this situation
tains both
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TABLE II
INTERDEPENDENCE FUNCTION p
(u ; u ; v ; v )
FOR THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME

Fig. 2.

Praxeic network for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Fig. 3. Satisﬁcing decision regions for the Prisoner’s Dilemma game: (a) joint
decisions and (b) individual decisions.

requires the invocation of a tie-breaker. For example,
is
the satisﬁcing option placing higher emphasis on individual inis the satisﬁcing option
terest (higher selectability), and
placing higher emphasis on group-interest (lower rejectability).
The individually satisﬁcing set for either player is

TABLE III
ORDINAL VN-M PAYOFF MATRIX FOR THE BATTLE OF THE SEXES GAME

peting standards. Although each has its own preference, both
would sell more products if they were to adopt a common standard. This is a coordination game [14]; either both players win
or both lose. It is not a game of pure coordination, however,
since the interests of the players do not perfectly coincide and
there is an opportunity for conﬂict and, hence, exploitation.
The vN-M version of this game is to form a payoff matrix by
juxtaposing the utility functions as given in Table III. Under this
and
formulation, there are two Nash equilibria, namely
. Since the Nash solution is not uniquely optimal, this solution concept does not resolve the issue. A standard game-theoretic way to deal with this problem is to deﬁne a coordinated
equilibrium by having each player randomize its decision according to a joint probability distribution [15], but this approach
is problematic, at best, for one-off play.
We may also address this game with satisﬁcing methodology
by constructing an interdependence function. Let us take selectability as the two players being with each other, regardless
of where they go, and let rejectability correspond to the costs
would prefer
if he did
of being at a particular function.
not take into consideration ’s preferences; similarly, would
prefer . Thus, we may express the myopic rejectabilities for
and in terms of parameters and , respectively, as

V. APPLICATION 2: BATTLE OF THE SEXES

where is ’s rejectability of and is ’s rejectability of .
The closer is to zero, the more is adverse to analogous
interpretation for with respect to attending . We assume
and
are to be consistent with
that
the stereotypes.
Since being together is a joint, rather than an individual objective, it is difﬁcult to form unilateral assessments of selectability,
but it is possible to characterize individually the conditional selectability. One way to do this is to specify conditional mass
and
, that is, ’s selectability condifunctions
tioned on ’s rejectability and ’s selectability conditioned on
’s rejectability. If strongly desired to reject , may account for this, if he cares about ’s feelings, by placing some
portion of his conditional selectability mass on . may construct her conditional selectability in a similar way, yielding

A simple example that is a prototype for complex social relationships where there is a strong incentive to cooperate, yet the
players do not agree on the right course of action, is the so-called
Battle of the Sexes game. The usual story-line is as follows (for
example, see [12] and [13]): two players and plan to meet
for a social function. prefers the ballet ( ), while prefers
the dog races ( ). Each also prefers to be with the other, however, regardless of venue. This game serves as a model for economic scenarios where two ﬁrms are to choose between com-

The parameters and determine the amount of deference
were to place all of her reone player gives the other. If
jectability mass on , then
may defer to ’s strong dislike

for
for
for

,
,
,

The individual decision regions are illustrated in Fig. 3(b). Note
that the set is a singleton except in the special situation of
. The Nash equilibrium solution emerges as a special
and
), but the satisﬁcing solution gives
case (e.g.,
pairs. Notice that the unithe solution for all admissible
lateral, or individually satisﬁcing decisions are compatible with
the bilateral, or group satisﬁcing decisions. Either both players
will defect or both will cooperate as determined by the values
of the parameters.
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the decisions are individual, they are obtained in a way that ensures compatibility with the interests of the group. If ’s aversion to is less than ’s aversion to , then both players will
go to ’s preference, namely, , and conversely. Under vN-M
game theory, if each player unconditionally defers to the other,
the result is disastrous for both. By contrast, with the satisﬁcing
approach, even though both players are maximally conditionally
deferential, the satisﬁcing solution results in a natural cooperative strategy that is socially defensible.

Fig. 4. Praxeic network for the Battle of the Sexes.

of

by placing of his selectability mass on . Similarly,
could show a conditional preference for if
were to reject strongly. With these conditional and marginal functions,
we may construct the interdependence function according to the
chain rule as

where we have assumed that ’s selectability conditioned on
’s rejectability is dependent only on ’s rejectability, that ’s
selectability conditioned on ’s rejectability is dependent only
on ’s rejectability, and that the myopic rejectability values of
and are independent. The praxeic network for this example
is given in Fig. 4.
With vN-M game theory, if each player is categorically altruistic (i.e., goes to in an attempt to please while goes to
in an attempt to please ), the result is that both players receive their worst payoffs. With satisﬁcing game theory, however,
the ability to be situationally altruistic eliminates this paradox.
To illustrate, we shall assume that both players are maximally
conditionally deferential and set
(in principle, however, they may assume any values in [0, 1]). Even in this most
deferential case, these conditional preferences do not commit
one to unconditional abdication of his or her own unilateral
preferences.
still myopically (that is, without taking into
consideration) prefers , and still myopically prefers , and
there is no intimation that either participant must “throw” the
game in order to accommodate the other.
Setting the index of caution equal to unity, we obtain the
jointly satisﬁcing set as
for
for
for
the individually satisﬁcing sets are
for
for
for
and the satisﬁcing rectangle is
for
for
for
Thus, we see that the individually satisﬁcing decisions are
compatible with the group satisﬁcing decisions. Even though

VI. APPLICATION 3: UAVS
Consider a system of three autonomous UAVs (i.e.,
). The group is required to engage targets (either for reconnaissance or combat) while avoiding unnecessary exposure to
hazard, collisions, and loss of communications. Each vehicle is
able to detect all targets and hazards within its ﬁeld of view,
and each may communicate with its nearest neighbors, provided
they are within range. Each UAV acts autonomously, but all are
jointly responsible to achieve high performance and satisfy the
constraints.
A. Simulation Model
To simplify this coordination problem to its bare essentials,
we assume the following.
C-1
The ﬁeld of action consists of a grid divided into
cells such that each target and each hazard is contained in one and only one cell. No cell may contain
both a target and a hazard.
C-2
The vehicles ﬂy at constant forward velocity but
variable lateral velocity in a three-abreast formacell per time unit.
tion. The forward velocity is
The lateral velocity is drawn from the set
cells per time unit, where negative signiﬁes a move
ahead and to the left, zero a move straight ahead,
and positive a move ahead and to the right. Each
cell may be occupied by, at most, one vehicle.
C-3
Each vehicle is able to detect all targets and hazards
within a distance of cells in the forward direction
from their current cell, with unlimited lateral detection.
C-4
If a vehicle enters a cell that contains a target, the
group scores one point.
C-5
If a vehicle enters a cell that contains a hazard, the
group loses one point.
C-6
Direct communication may occur between two adjacent vehicles only if they are within lateral cells
of each other.
C-7
Indirect or relayed communication may occur between two nonadjacent vehicles if, and only if, a
third vehicle can communicate directly with each
of them.
C-8
Communicating vehicles may provide each other
with: a) their positions, b) their current and anticipated action commands, and c) negotiation proposals with respect to current and anticipated commands.
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C-9

C-10

If vehicles cannot communicate either directly or
indirectly, they cannot know the positions or the
actions (either instantiated or anticipated) of each
other.
Vehicles may not collide, that is, they may not approach closer to each other than adjacent cells.

In evaluating our proposed methodology, we adopt, as a
baseline, the jointly optimal solution. We then consider two
satisﬁcing system designs. The ﬁrst provides a globally satisﬁcing solution somewhat analogous to a globally optimal
solution. The second approach illustrates how the satisﬁcing
methodology can be adapted to situations involving heterogeneous agents with partial knowledge or hierarchical structures.
Together, the two satisﬁcing solutions illustrate the ﬂexibility
of the satisﬁcing design space and provide some idea of the
tradeoffs between structure, complexity, and performance. Note
that all solutions assume a limited horizon, consistent with our
earlier assumption of a limited forward ﬁeld of view. Let us
for the
designate and order the positions of the vehicles as
for the center vehicle, and
for the
left-most vehicle,
right-most vehicle.
B. Optimal Solution
To obtain the optimal solution to the limited-horizon decision
problem, we must compute the total target-minus-hazard count
for each of the possible paths available to each agent, subject
to the constraints. For a horizon of depth , there is a total of
available for each agent. This deﬁnes the reachable cone.
Thus, if each of three agents were to work strictly in isolation,
calculations. However, to satwe would require a total of
isfy the constraints of avoiding collisions and loss of communication, we must calculate the costs for all joint paths between
and
and between
and
. Note that since
agents
and
cannot violate constraints without consideration of
, it is not necessary to compute the costs of the joint paths
between
,
, and
simultaneously. The total number of
arithmetic operations that must be performed to compute the
where
is
jointly optimal solution is on the order of
and
, the number of
the cardinality of . For
operations is 1458. Notice that this count is exponential in the
horizon depth.
C. Satisﬁcing Solutions
The interdependence function for our hypothetical UAV
system is a function of six variables, which we denote by
, where denotes an option available to (that is, the option that
might instantiate
in the interest of its selectability) and denotes an option availmight avoid instantiating in
able to (that is, the option that
the interest of its rejectability). Our satisﬁcing approach requires
each agent to derive from
a set of jointly satisﬁcing decisions, that is, decisions that, from
its perspective, would be satisﬁcing for all agents. From this
set of multipartite decision vectors, each player must determine
which individual decision it should make. We assume that all
agents are operating with the same model.

The interdependence function characterizes all of the relationships that exist between the six elements of the praxeic
system. Once it is speciﬁed, it is straightforward to obtain
the satisﬁcing joint and individual solutions. Its speciﬁcation,
however, may be extremely complex. At each moment of
(discrete) time, each vehicle has three possible options at its
disposal, and since each option must be considered in terms of
both its selectability and its rejectability, the interdependence
function has six arguments, each of which may assume any of
speciﬁcations.
three values, yielding a total of
For many applications, however, we can reduce the number
of independent parameters by exploiting inﬂuence linkages
between agents; we may compose the interdependence function
by identifying the appropriate inﬂuence linkages.
1) Global Satisﬁcing Structure: For this case, we adopt the
following operational deﬁnitions for the preferences for the options available to each vehicle.
•
The criterion for rejectability is to avoid hazards.
•
The criterion for selectability is to seek targets while
avoiding collisions or communication loss.
For this problem, we assume that the joint rejectability criterion
is independent of the joint selectability criterion. Thus, we may
factor the interdependence function into the product of the joint
selectability and joint rejectability functions as

(11)
If constraint violations are not imminent, then each agent operates with its own marginal selectability and rejectability functions, which are determined on the basis of the number of hazards and targets that can be encountered, respectively, for each
option. If a constraint between two agents is imminent, then a
joint selectability function is computed such that the constraints
are honored between the two affected agents, while the third
agent is free to operate without constraint. If a constraint violation involving all three agents is imminent, then a joint selectability function is computed for all three.
The computational burden for computing the marginal selectability and rejectability functions depends on the way the
interdependence function is factored. If no factorization is employed, the total number of operations would be on the order of
; however, by factoring the interdependence
function as indicated in (11), only
operations are required per agent. Computing the jointly satisﬁcing
operations per agent, with
set requires an additional
operations per agent required to compute the individually satisﬁcing set. Thus, the total number of operations per agent to
,
, and
is
compute the satisﬁcing sets for
, which is much less than that for the optimal solution. Notice that this complexity is quadratic, rather
than exponential, in the horizon depth.
2) Markov Satisﬁcing Structure: For this case, the deﬁnitions of the utility functions are modiﬁed as follows:
• The rejectability of a move is determined by whether it
leads to: a) a hazard, b) a loss of communication, or c) a
collision.
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•

The selectability of a move is determined solely by
whether it leads to a target.
More important, we wish to consider the effects of a Markovian constraint on agent interaction. In particular, we make
the selectability and rejectability of a move contemplated by
to be independent of the deliberations of
, conditioned
on knowledge of , and vice versa. For vehicle , let us view
viewed in terms of selectability, and
as
the variable as
in terms of rejectability.
There are many ways to approach the design of this system.
As a general rule of thumb, it is reasonable to consider ﬁrst those
attributes of the problem that are the most critical. We adopt here
a conservative stance and assume that the rejectability attributes
are more critical to the overall success of the mission than selectability. This is appropriate since we assume that the number
of hazards is greater than the number of targets.
First consider rejectability. Clearly, each agent must place
high rejectability on moves that would take it into cells occupied
by hazards and it must also avoid loss of communication and
collisions. Because of the relative positioning of the vehicles, it
cannot simultaneously avoid losing communicais clear that
; similarly, it cannot simultaneously avoid
tion with both
collisions with these two agents. Thus, primary responsibility
for these two rejectability criteria must fall to the wing agents.
In other words, in addition to avoiding hazards, they must adjust their rejectability values to accommodate the actions of .
to both
and
Thus, there is a natural ﬂow of inﬂuence from

reduce its selectability for moving to the right, even if hits are
sacriﬁced. This is a manifestation of situational altruism (a willingness to defer if so doing would actually beneﬁt the other),
as opposed to categorical altruism (unconditional abdication of
one’s individual interest in order to beneﬁt another, regardless
of whether the other would actually beneﬁt). Thus, there is a
to . By a similar argument,
natural ﬂow of inﬂuence from
there is also a ﬂow of inﬂuence from
to . The overall ﬂow
of inﬂuence is thus given by Fig. 5. The ﬂows of inﬂuence for
other hierarchies are deﬁned similarly. A total of six different
ﬂow conﬁgurations would be possible. An important feature of
this structure is that the system may be reconﬁgured dynamically as the relative positions of the agents in their environment
evolves.
Fig. 5 is a praxeic network corresponding to the factorization
of the interdependence function as

Let us now consider selectability. This criterion is concerned
only with attacking targets. Typically, the opportunities to hit
targets, especially with a sparse target scenario, will not be the
same for all vehicles. As each agent looks ahead in its reachable cone over the next moves, it can calculate the number of
hits available to it. Let us designate the agent with the greatest
number of possible hits as (for the current time only) the primary vehicle. The vehicle with the next greatest number of possible hits, given that the primary vehicle pursues its targets in
an unconstrained manner, is the secondary vehicle. For the sake
is primary and
is secof illustration, let us assume that
ondary, and is tertiary. Accordingly, we will deﬁne a (tempoﬁrst priority in selecting its
rally local) hierarchy which gives
targets, and gives
second priority. Such a hierarchy is somewhat heuristic since if the sum of the hits possible for the other
two vehicles, acting together unconstrained, may result in a total
number of hits that exceeds what would otherwise be possible.
Nevertheless, in the interest of simplicity, we adopt this as our
design policy.
Our next step is to account for the interdependencies between
rejectability and selectability. We will assume that rejectability
and selectability for a single agent are independent; hence, there
are no direct links between one agent’s selectability persona and
its rejectability persona. There may, however, be inﬂuence ﬂows
between selectability and rejectability between different agent
may be inﬂuenced by
and
personas. Let us consider how
. If, for example,
were to reject a move to the right, then
could be detrimental to
if it could
a move to the right by
result in a loss of communication. Consequently, it would be
to defer conditionally to
by being willing to
prudent for

The structure of these conditional interdependencies is a
function of the relative positions of the agents. If neither communication loss nor collisions is imminent, then the conditional
rejectabilities degenerate to the marginal ones, which are determined as a function of the minimum number of hazards that
an agent could encounter for each option. If a particular option
were to violate a constraint, then the conditional rejectability
would be adjusted to reject that option under the appropriate
circumstances.
Concerning selectability, if the reachable cones for each of
the agents do not intersect, then the joint selectability is the
product of the individual selectability marginals. If the cones
do intersect, then priority is given to the primary agent and then
to the secondary agent, with selectability being proportional to
the maximum number of targets that are reachable with each
option.
Once the joint and marginal selectability and rejectability
function values are computed, the joint and marginal satisﬁcing
sets may be constructed and a compromise solution identiﬁed.
If, for the initial value of the negotiation index the compromise set is empty, then may be iteratively lowered until the
compromise set is not empty. In this way, the individual decisions are compatible with group interests, although at the possible expense of some individual satisfaction as the players compromise in order to reach a decision that satisﬁes both group and
individual interests. Notice that this negotiation process does

Fig. 5. Praxeic network for the hierarchy S

!S !S
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TABLE IV
MONTE CARLO RESULTS: GLOBAL STRUCTURE, MARKOV STRUCTURE,
AND OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR HORIZON DEPTH d

=3

TABLE V
MONTE CARLO RESULTS: SATISFICING VERSUS OPTIMAL,
Horizon Depth 2, 3, 4, AND 5

=

Fig. 6. Simulated UAV trajectories: (a) Satisﬁcing design. (b) Optimal design.

optimal solution and both satisﬁcing solutions. The initial conditions as well as hazard and target locations are generated randomly for each trial. The score for each trial is computed as the
number of targets encountered minus the number of hazards encountered for the three agents. The sample means and standard
deviations for the scores of both the satisﬁcing and optimal solutions are indicated in the table.
Table V presents results for 100 Monte Carlo simulations for
global structure and optimal solutions for horizon depths of 2,
3, 4, and 5. The difference between the satisﬁcing and optimal
averages is not statistically signiﬁcant.
These results indicate: a) performance of the global structure
satisﬁcing solution is essentially the same as the performance
of the optimal solution; b) the performance of the Markov satisﬁcing solution is slightly worse than the performance of the
global structure solution. This result is due to the tighter mode
of coordination between the agents. The computational burden
for both satisﬁcing concepts is signiﬁcantly less (approximately
) than the computaan order of magnitude for a depth of
tional burden for the optimal solution.
VII. CONCLUSION

not require the recalculation of the selectability and rejectability
functions; hence, it is computationally very inexpensive.
D. Simulation Results
Fig. 6 presents typical simulation results for a three-agent
UAV system operating over ten time intervals and with a horizon
. The symbols “ ” and “ ” denote hazards
depth of
and targets, respectively. Hazards and targets are generated randomly, with the probability of a hazard 0.7 and the probability
of target being 0.1. The three line segments represent the trajectories of the three agents. Time ﬂows from the bottom to the top
of the ﬁgure along the ordinate, and the abscissa represent the
lateral positions of the vehicles. Fig. 6(a) illustrates the satisﬁcing trajectory, and Fig. 6(b) illustrates the optimal trajectory.
Note that the hazard/target environment is the same. Table IV
displays the results from 100 Monte Carlo simulations for the

Coordinated behavior is a difﬁcult attribute to incorporate
into a multiagent system. It is important to appreciate that coordination usually cannot be done without conﬂict, but conﬂict need not degenerate to competition, which can be destructive. Competition, however, is often a byproduct of optimization, whereby each participant in a multiagent endeavor seeks
to achieve the best outcome for itself, regardless of the consequences to other participants or to the group.
Satisﬁcing game theory is not presented as a replacement for
conventional decision-making methodologies in all situations.
When individual rationality is an appropriate model, standard
techniques will be adequate. The potential beneﬁt of this alternative approach is that it provides a means to account for sophisticated social behavior. This theory is a signiﬁcant departure
from conventional methods of multiple-agent decision making.
The major differences include:
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replacement of asocial utility functions that express preferences of decision makers as functions of the actions of
other decision makers with social utility functions that express preferences of decision makers as functions of the
preferences of other decision makers;
• replacement of individual rationality (which does not accommodate compatible notions of group and individual
interests) with satisﬁcing rationality (which does accommodate notions of both group and individual interests);
• replacement of single vN-M utility functions with dual
utility functions that separate the desirable and undesirable attributes of the options;
• replacement of unconditional utilities with conditional
utilities which propagate through the system via the
chain rule to create a joint interdependence function, thus
allowing individual and group preferences to emerge as
natural consequences of social interaction.
The notable features of this approach are that
• it permits explicit modeling of situationally altruistic behavior;
• it provides a natural framework for negotiation;
• it may be solved using standard Bayesian network techniques such as Pearl’s Belief Propagation Algorithm or
the Sum-Product Algorithm for factor graphs;
• it serves as a systematic system design methodology that
is consistent, exhaustive, and parsimonious.
REFERENCES
[1] W. C. Stirling, “Social utility functions–Part 1: Theory,” IEEE Trans.
Syst., Man, Cybern. C, Appl. Rev., vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 522–532, Nov.
2005.
, Satisﬁcing Games and Decision Making: With Applications to En[2]
gineering and Computer Science. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2003.
[3] J. Pearl, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems. San Mateo,
CA: Morgan Kaufmann, 1988.
[4] R. G. Cowell, A. P. Dawid, S. L. Lauritzen, and D. J. Spiegelhalter, Probabilistic Networks and Expert Systems. New York: Springer Verlag,
1999.
[5] F. V. Jensen, Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs. New York:
Springer Verlag, 2001.
[6] Y. Xiang, Probabilistic Reasoning in Multiagent Systems: A Graphical
Models Approach. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002.
[7] Y. Xiang and V. Lesser, “On the role of multiply sectioned Bayesian
networks for cooperative multiagent systems,” IEEE Syst., Man, Cybern.
A, Syst., Humans, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 489–501, Jul. 2003.

543

[8] F. R. Kschischang, B. J. Frey, and H.-A. Loeliger, “Factor graphs and
the sum-product algorithm,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 47, no. 2, pp.
498–519, Feb. 2001.
[9] M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987.
[10] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books,
1984.
[11] W. Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma. New York: Doubleday, 1992.
[12] M. Bacharach, Economics and the Theory of Games. London, U.K.:
Macmillan, 1976.
[13] E. Rasmusen, Games and Information. Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell,
1989.
[14] D. K. Lewis, Convention. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969.
[15] M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994.

Wynn C. Stirling received the B.A. degree (Hons.) in mathematics and the M.S.
degree in electrical engineering from the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, in
1969 and 1971, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from
Stanford University, Stanford, CA, in 1983.
From 1972 to 1975, he was with Rockwell International Corporation, Anaheim, CA, and from 1975 to 1984, he was with ESL, Inc., Sunnyvale, CA, where
he was responsible for the development of multivehicle trajectory reconstruction
capabilities. He joined the faculty of the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, in 1984, where he
is a Professor. He is the author or coauthor of more than 70 publications. He is
coauthor of a graduate-level text titled Mathematical Methods and Algorithms
for Signal Processing (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000) and is the
author of a monograph titled Satisﬁcing Games and Decision Making: with Applications to Engineering and Computer Science (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2003). His current research interests include multiagent decision
theory, estimation theory, information theory, and stochastic processes.
Dr. Stirling is a Member of Phi Beta Kappa and Tau Beta Pi. He has served
on the program committees for conferences on imprecise probability theory and
multiagent decision theory.

Richard L. Frost (M’77) received the B.S. degree
(Hons.) in physics in 1975, and the M.S.E.E. and
Ph.D. degrees from the University of Utah, Salt Lake
City, in 1977 and 1979, respectively.
He joined the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, in 1979,
then returned to the faculty of the University of Utah
from 1981 to 1984. After three years with Sperry
Corporation, he joined the Department of Electrical
and Computer Engineering, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, in 1987, where he is currently
an Associate Professor. His research interests include information theory,
especially source coding and quantization, signal processing, and multiagent
decision theory.

Authorized licensed use limited to: Brigham Young University. Downloaded on February 5, 2009 at 15:33 from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.

